

We study the Rényi differential privacy of **cyclic SGD**, with training examples sampled without replacement. We propose two examples where gradient-perturbed cyclic SGD is both **not faster** yet **less private** than plain SGD.

Differential Privacy for Machine Learning

Motivation

- Machine learning models can **leak private information** from their training data.
- This enables reconstruction or membership **attacks** that could be harmful in some applications: medicine, census, NLP...
- Ideally, the model should not depend too much on one individual data point.

WHEN YOU TRAIN PREDICTIVE MODELS ON INPUT FROM YOUR USERS, IT CAN LEAK INFORMATION IN UNEXPECTED WAYS.




Consider two datasets D and D' differing only by **one data point**. A randomized algorithm outputs respectively p or q when run on each dataset. It has $(\alpha, \epsilon(\alpha))$ RDP if the two probability distributions are statistically **undistinguishable**:

Rényi Differential Privacy

$$D_\alpha(p || q) := \frac{1}{\alpha - 1} \log \int p(u)^\alpha q(u)^{1-\alpha} du \leq \epsilon(\alpha)$$

Adding **noise** to the query: $f(D) + \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma^2 I_d)$

Ensures **privacy**: $\epsilon(\alpha) = \frac{\alpha s^2}{2\sigma^2}$



Main Properties

- Post-processing cannot increase ϵ .
- Composition increases ϵ linearly with the number of queries: $\epsilon \mapsto t\epsilon$
- Subsampling shrinks ϵ quadratically by the subsampling parameter: $\epsilon \mapsto \rho^2 \epsilon$

Privacy of SGD with replacement

Gradient **perturbation** with noise $\eta_t \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma^2 I_d)$

$$\theta_{t+1} = \theta_t - \gamma(\nabla f(\theta_t, x_{i(t)}) + \eta_t)$$

Assuming the gradients are bounded by L and $\sigma \geq 2L$, after one epoch, the algorithm achieves RDP:

$$\epsilon(\alpha) \leq \mathcal{O} \left(n \times \frac{1}{n^2} \times \frac{\alpha L^2}{\sigma^2} \right)$$

composition subsampling

“Private” Cyclic SGD is Not Faster

Why Should I Shuffle?

- It is what is **used in practice**.
- Allows faster implementations, including in distributed settings.
- It has been recently proved that it enjoys a **faster convergence rate** of $\mathcal{O}(1/T^2)$ against $\mathcal{O}(1/T)$ for plain SGD (on *strongly convex* objectives).

- However, **no privacy guarantees** are known for this algorithm because sampling is no longer independent.


Algorithm 1 Private SGD with Shuffling

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1: procedure PSGD( $\mathcal{D}, \theta_0, \gamma, \ell, L, e, \tau, \sigma^2$ )
2:    $\theta \leftarrow \theta_0$ 
3:   for  $i = 1$  to  $e/\tau$  do
4:      $(s_1, \dots, s_n) \leftarrow \text{Shuffle}(\{1, \dots, n\})$ 
5:     for  $j = 1$  to  $\lfloor \tau n \rfloor$  do
6:        $x \leftarrow x_{s_j}$ 
7:        $g \leftarrow \text{Clip}(\nabla_{\theta} \ell(\theta, x), L)$ 
8:       Sample  $\eta \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma^2 I_d)$ 
9:        $\theta \leftarrow \theta - \gamma(g + \eta)$ 
10:  return  $\theta$ 


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At the beginning of each epoch, **shuffle** the dataset. Then do **one pass** through, and **stop** after a fixed fraction has been seen. Start again.



Shuffling can be Less Private

- Are privacy guarantees **weaker** for full cyclic SGD than for plain SGD?



- Two possible loss functions $\ell_1(\theta)$ or $\ell_2(\theta)$
- Do two SGD steps with $\theta_0 = 1$ and $\gamma = 1$
- With probability 0.5, output final θ
- Else output one at random in $\{-2, 0, 2\}$
- Sampling with replacement is more private than without: $(\infty, \log(1.75))$ vs $(\infty, \log(4))$.
- Choosing twice the same data point preserves more privacy.
- The final iterate reveals the whole trajectory.

References

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